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The new Habilitation, established in Italy in 2010 and launched in 2012, was introduced 
to filter eligible candidates in the competition for associate and full professorships. Its 
purpose is to limit agreements between colleagues to make academic appointments on 
the basis of patronage and instead set minimum conditions based on scholarly output. 
This study draws on a national dataset in four disciplinary fields – Physics; Engineering; 
Law; Economics: two being bibliometric and two non-bibliometric. The main 
hypothesis is that a candidate’s current position and seniority (years after last 
promotion) should play no part in determining the award of the Habilitation. Only 
indicators of output should be considered by committees. After controlling for such 
indicators as publications, affiliation with committee members, age, gender, current 
position and time since last promotion, data show better predictors of attaining the 
habilitation to be: 1) quality of scientific output (H index and articles in top ranked 
journals); 2) current ladder rank; 3) younger candidates, especially within the same 
ranks. As a result, the traditional seniority pattern and the allegedly opaque procedures 
in recruitment and promotion appear to be yielding place before quicker career paths for 
the more productive.  





1. Introduction: habilitation as a new recruitment and career advancement tool 
 
Recruitment in Italian universities has often been characterized by open door policies 
and by long periods when national competition for appointment to post was suspended. A 
comparative survey with French Physicists (Pezzoni et al., 2012) found that imbalances in the 
demographic profile of Italian academics reduced their scientific output mainly because of the 
absence of appropriate and regular controls over recruitment and advancement. Arguably, when 
such restrictions are imposed, some loss of talent may take place. Nevertheless, whilst liberal 
recruitment practices may make it easier for the individual to embark on an academic career, 
they are detrimental to scholarly output. The introduction of the new Habilitation is expected to 
tackle the problems both of insufficient qualification for new staff and of their career 
advancement. In Italy, Personal influence, as Clark noted (1977, 1983) has always played a 
crucial role along with the formal legal procedures enshrined in concorsi (competitions). The 
latter brought together a mix of Napoleonic formal rules combined with the traditional influence 
wielded by the Chair (Clark, 1977). Against this backdrop, the Habilitation provides a new 
instrument for scientific and public recognition precisely because it determines the possible pace 
of promotion and advancement, which was found to be relevant (Youtie et. al. 2013). Law 
240/2010, also known as Gelmini Law, cut back the ranks of permanent positions from three – 
full professors, associate professors, and assistant professors (ricercatori) – to two: full and 
associate professors. Despite the massive literature on early career patterns in sciences and their 
determining influence upon subsequent life-long careers, such data have a major importance for 
policy. In the case of senior scholars, they show up both personal strategies and publication 
range which nevertheless contribute to promotion (Mumford et al., 2005).  
The Habilitation is not a new device for academic recruitment. It has been in practice 
for many years in Germany, where it is comparable to the new fixed-term assistant 
professorship in Italy: essentially, the German Habilitation is a second PhD and focuses on a 
topic differing from the original PhD dissertation (Enders, 2001). The German Habilitation is, 
thus very different from its Italian counterpart. In France, the Habilitation is a qualification 
awarded by the Conseil National des Universités (Musselin, 2004) and is very similar to the 
Italian case. The Spanish abilitación, in its first form, restricted the numbers awarded in keeping 
with the number of posts available. The acreditación, which replaced it, has no cut-off points 
and in this respect bears greater similarity to the Italian case. Despite their nominal similarity, 
and their marked differences this aspect will not be developed further.  
In Italy, the reform seeks to make candidates eligible for participation in future 
competitions for full professorship (first level) and associate professorships (second level) 
without the prior condition of the idoneità (eligibility, or fit-for-the-job), a condition previously 
used to give posts to high scoring but rejected candidates from earlier competitions. Success in 
this competition does not necessarily guarantee appointment. In one respect, the Habilitation 
creates a “tougher pool of candidate and a selective examination”. Compared to competitive 
examinations, the Habilitation extends recruitment in time by adding one further step, a feature 
sometimes presented as a “tournament” (Musselin, 2004). Furthermore, it introduces an element 
of deliberate opting in or opting out. (Musselin 2005b: 50), particularly at the level of associate 
professor. If those without a tenured post are to survive they must obtain a Habilitation. New 
fixed-term appointments and/or positions funded externally, held by post-docs and assistant 
professors, merely underline both the situation and the choice to be made either way.  
Despite the avowed purpose of strengthening meritocracy further, this initiative 
manages even the complex issue of current aging of Italian academic staff whose details are 
discussed later. To have the best person in an open position can be seen as reflecting the 
Mertonian assumption about universalism (Long, Fox, 1995; Long 1978). This assumption 
clashes both with social capital and with the shared concerns of interest communities, though in 
the case of Italy these tensions tend to be more evident. More recently Su (2014) suggested that 
some degree of meritocracy, defined as “human capital alone” (that is, skills and abilities 
acquired by the individual) can coexist with social capital on condition that ad hoc policies for 
women and minorities are put in hand.  
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This paper analyzes the first round of the Habilitation, which took place in 2012. The 
article is divided into three parts. The second section provides an overview of the data available. 
Evidence from other studies is reviewed. Section three describes four logistic regression models 
for each area analyzed with the purpose of ascertaining whether indicators other than academic 
productivity and output are associated with the outcome. Included in the data is the Habilitation 
for full Professorship which provides us with more comprehensive detail about previous ranks 
held in the course of an individual’s career in academia. In the concluding section, some 
remarks are made about the changes the new Habilitation appears already to have accomplished.  
 
 
2. Available data and literature  
 
Data about the Habilitation and its procedure, which entails a research evaluation of 
individuals by committees of 5 senior academics, are transparent and publicly available1. The 
universe, or sub-universe (single disciplines) may be analyzed without the problems, habitually 
faced by surveys – that of response rate (Bentley, Kyvik, 2013). The list of variables used is as 
follows: a) Dummy of attainment of the title, used as dependent variable; b) Three indicators of 
scientific productivity, similar to other studies (Ginther, Kahn, 2004; Sabharwal, Hu, 2013; Tian 
2000; Saatay, Ramanujam 1983); c) age; d) gender; e) status of the candidate (in university or 
outside university; only insiders enter the analysis as observations). For “insider”candidates (i.e. 
university staff), further variables are gathered: e-i) Position held by the candidate (i.e. full types 
of research assistants and associates); e-ii) Membership of the same Department as one of the 
member of the Committee (“1” if a candidate comes from one of the four2 departments as the 
senior evaluators; “0” if not; variable label “aff”).  
Three indicators of scientific productivity (b) are split between the hard sciences and the 
soft sciences. The hard sciences include: (α) the Hirsch index normalized by academic age: a 
natural number comparable within similar disciplines; (β) normalized number3 of articles; and 
(γ) normalized number of citations. The soft sciences provide: (α’) normalized number of 
articles published in top ranked journals. In this case, an attempt was made to discriminate 
general productivity – alleged in most of the cases to be of modest value, parochial and poor in 
originality and innovation (Perotti 2002) – from a selected list of top-ranked reviews per sector, 
as with other studies (Giles, Garand, 2007; Nightingale, Scott, 2007); (β’) stipulated number of 
books; and (γ’) number of chapters in books and articles. Regarding the reliability and validity 
of the data, the three indicators used in this study were assumed to have an intrinsic validity for 
research productivity4, while nothing they can tell about collaboration networks (social capital: 
Pezzoni et al. 2012) nor about specialization in topics (Leahey, et al. 2010). H indexes and 
articles in top-ranked journals were assumed to measure a proxy of quality of scientific 
production, while the others can be assumed as productivity indices for quantity of output, with 
uncertainty about its quality. Differences in bibliometric and non-bibliometric sectors are not 
investigated further. Nonetheless, bibliometric indicators are more a reflection of the relevance 
of publications through the citations and the H index, while not-bibliometric items derive their 
importance through being published in pre-selected journals5. It should be noted that some 
                                                          
1 Row individual data (full publications and CVs all in pdf files) are uploaded by candidates and certified by the 
Minister. An external observer can see the CVs (with date of birth and the full list of publications), the outcomes with 
explanations of decisions by all single members of the committees and a personal scheme with the indicators.  
2 Usually Committees are made of 5 member, being one from abroad. Affiliation of the scholars not working in Italy 
is not taken into account.  
3 Normalizations are basically referred to a measure of personal contribution to an output when the latter are signed 
by more persons.  
4 Full texts have been uploaded to a national repository by the candidate; the main Italian publishers signed an 
agreement with the Minister to make available free and certified pdf copies to authors requesting them.  
5 It is to be mentioned that for not-bibliometric disciplined the full list of top-ranked journals was resealed basically in 
the same time that candidates were applying. This implies that scholars have never selected a journal on the basis of 
its ranking or status, unless the status and the prestige was totally informal and not recognized by any official 
document. To this regard, any evidence discussed by McDonamld and Kam (2007) cannot still be observed. The 
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criticism arose over the alleged misuses of bibliometrics in the social sciences (Rebora, Turri, 
2013) which affected a combination of managerial tool and straight peer review practices 
(Musselin, 2013).  
Committees had thus to check the minimal thresholds for each indicator based on the 
medians of the total population. These values were drawn up by the Minister for the occasion. 
Indicatively, a person ought to be awarded habilitated only if two of the three indicators reached 
the medians among the sector in question (including those scholars not applying). Since 
indicators of productivity are considered to be continuous, they are treated as interval variables. 
Credits assigned by the committees, for instance, competitive projects or grants, led or 
participated in, did not figure in the analysis. As Youtie at al. (2013) noted credits such as these 
play a marginal role in Europe compared to the US. Though Committees were many (180) and 
recognized a strong autonomy at micro-discipline level (Becher and Trowler 2001), the topics of 
publications are not taken into account. This decision can be justified by a US study, which 
found that cross-community output is not seen as relevant for attaining one’s rank (Millar, 
2013). Either way, it is assumed that multi-applicants to neighboring disciplines have solved the 
question of possible interdisciplinary profiles. Data are treated in terms of disciplinary fields – 
some 14 in all (aree disciplinari). Multi-applicants are computed as “winners” if they were 
awarded the Habilitation in at least one sector. Similarly, affiliations of committee members, 
were controlled for, on grounds that it could affect outcome (Combes, P. P., Linnemer, L., 
Visser, M., 2008). Thus, the variables “aff” indicate that 13.7% of all candidates who are 
university staff shared the same department affiliation as one of the Committee members (for 
candidates applying in more disciplines, affiliation “1” indicates the same department in at least 
one scientific sector).  
Age, even though a simple variable, deserves some qualifying. Date of birth, and hence 
age at 2012, does not mean time spent in research: candidates may have finished their studies at 
different ages. Equally, they may have different career trajectories into and out of universities or 
other organizations. Despite the association between the H index and age (Mannella, Rossi 
2013), or even net years spent in research, this different distribution is one reason to control the 
first hypothesis with the treatment of age. Age remains a key variable above all in respect of the 
socialization that scholars live and accumulate across their careers. If, at an early stage, they join 
a good Department, this will have greater impact than if they do so later. Publication practices 
and strategies are shaped thereby (Aschhoff, Grimpe 2013).  
Drawing on annually updated datasets of Italian employees at all universities when the 
most recent (or very first) promotion occurred for each individual, could be plotted. This 
supplies a useful detail in understanding the most recent step of one’s career and also whether 
seniority might have been taken in account even for people with a poor publications’ list. Of 
Italian university staff, 51.9% had their most recent promotion (or entry as employee) in the 
previous 5 years (from 2007 till 2012); a further 30.8% between 2001 and 2006; 17.3% had 
been promoted in the year 2000 or before.  
Another approach involves gender. Women’s careers in higher education have been 
extensively addressed (Bagilhole, Goode, 2001; Duberleya, Cohen, 2010; van den Brink, 
Benschop, Jansen, 2010). Gender discrimination was found to relate to social capital (Brooks et. 
al. 2014). Baker (2010) found that women may consider themselves not to meet minimum 
requirements even prior to compete for career advancement in academia career a self-valuation 
deriving from early socialization, family responsibilities and gender assigned self-perception. 
This mechanism seems analogous of that of “cooling out” analyzed by Burton Clark (1960).  
In Italy, as was pointed out earlier, the Habilitation as a new tool is expected to counter 
old traditions based on a mix of patronage and the influence of mentoring (Kirchmeyer 2005) 
and on Napoleonic legislation. Thus the best candidate in an open competition can be winnowed 
out. However, the Habilitation does not encourage inbreeding to the same degree. Habilitation 
holders may will participate anywhere in the country. Beneath these notions the issue of the 
self-reproduction of communities of scholars is at stake. For this reason the way academic 
                                                          
hypothesis that the list contains not prestigious journals and that this might have brought to false speculations upon 
the worthiness of the attainment of the title in accordance with this indicator remain, hitherto, without answer.  
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disciplinary communities, scattered throughout the nation’s institutions of higher education, 




3. Descriptive statistics of candidates  
 
The current situation of Italian university personnel is critical. The average age of 
scholars is rising and the prospect of a budget to cover the needs of academic recruitment is 
remote. Since 2008, the total number of professors in Italy started to decline as a policy of “turn 
over” aimed at cutting posts. In 2008 the total number of professors in universities was 62.768; 
in 2012 already 54.929. On December 31st 2012 the average age was: 58.9 for full professors; 
52.9 for associates; 45.4 for research assistants. A decade before, in 2002, the corresponding 
statistic was: 57.2; 50.9; 43.8. This development stemmed from a progressively postponed 
admission to the three respective ranks.  
The first round in the new habilitation process reflected a massive demand to either to 
enter Italian academia (associate level) or to accede to the highest level possible (full 
professors). Tables 1 and 2 which respectively present two areas in bibliometric and two in non-
bibliometric disciplines, provide general information about the phenomenon. The list of 
positions reflected recent reforms. The recruitment of fixed-term research assistants began in 
2005 with a second type being established in 2010. The majority of research assistantships are 
still permanent appointments. Both research assistants and associate professors are split between 
“confirmed” and “unconfirmed” status. Grosso modo, rank positions consist basically of full 
professors, confirmed associates and (confirmed) research assistants. This latter category is 
important. An unconfirmed researcher or an unconfirmed associate can through the habilitation 
skip the steps, respectively, to associate or full professorship promotion, provided their ratings 
are strong enough. No account is taken of “other” positions. They are few and those few 
represent posts disappearing from the Italian university as retirement takes its toll. The analysis 
also excluded other non-employees in university on the grounds they may well be young 
researchers holding other non-permanent appointments or, alternatively, they were researchers 
at other institutions.  
Table 1 shows that the main candidates for full professorships are currently confirmed 
associate professors (associate professors with no further detail are a strong minority). In each 
rank, the ratio of people applying to be ‘habilitated’ is interesting. The habilitation may fulfil a 
“cooling out function” (Clark, 1960) amongst those who recognize the lightness of their 
publication list. However, further information about publications of non-candidates is, 
unfortunately, unavailable. It is possible, however, to compute the average ages for those 
awarded the habilitation and those failing it. This information figures in the last two columns of 
the Tables 1 and 2. For the bibliometic domain in both areas, the average ages of awardees for 
full professors’ rank are younger: 48.7 vs. 50.2 in physics; 45.6 vs. 46.4 in engineering).  
 
Table 1 around here  
 
In Table 2 the situation is very similar. As in Table 1, around half the associate professors were 
candidates for habilitation to full professorship, while much less are the candidates who are 
research assistants, both expressed as absolute numbers or percentage over the total population 
in a rung. As in table 1, those awarded are younger than those denied: 44.1 v. 47.4 in Law; 44.5 




Table 2 around here  
 
4. Data Analyses: is something changing in career ladders? 
 
The analysis presented here focuses on discussing three models applied to each area. The first 
model covers three indicators of scientific productivity to determine if selection of candidates is 
simply a function of their output with the type of their production. As was explained above, in 
the analysis these indicators are considered as representing the essence of objectivity and 
meritocracy. Be that as it may scholarly literature, and not just classics like Merton, always has 
always expressed misgivings about the non-meritocratic aspects and predictability of career 
advancement in academia (Lent et al., 1994). Being aware of this general assumption suggests 
however that the paradigm the new institution of habilitation ought to uphold is the principle of 
“objective measurements of productivity” that traditionally is absent: 
people differentially recall, weight, and integrate past performance information in arriving at efficacy 
appraisals; thus, such appraisals are not likely to be isomorphic with, or mechanically implanted by, past 
performance indicators (Lent et al. 1994: 87) 
In this respect self-efficacy (Lent et al. 1994) is very important form of competition if one is to 
be genuinely and deeply confident of one’s success. The Weberian concept of Beruf and the 
“calling” aspect of academic career can serve to illustrate the difference. In countries like Italy 
where higher education is characterized by low investments in R&D and restrictions of 
recruitment and promotions, the Habilitation may act as a strong deterrent, encouraging many 
young scholars to “opt out” of the academic career.  
The second model examines age. Is an individual candidate, with the same publications output 
as his – or her – competitors more likely to advance in his/her career if, for instance, he/she is 
younger or older. Literature on age and output has a solid history, especially in the United 
States. Clemente (1973) discussed findings dating back to the 1940s and 1950s which affirmed 
that early publications could be a good proxy of the individual’s career potential. Thus early 
publications are a pointer to high research outputs across one’s whole career. More recently, 
Bozeman, Dietz, and Gaughan (2001), focusing only on hard sciences and technology-related 
professions, argued that today post-doctoral students (who in the Italian context would figure as 
outsiders) are not candidates with the best potential for research and development. Career 
trajectories, even outside academia also see young adults enjoying their best laboratory 
experiences. Levin and Stephan (1991) reported that scholarly output cannot depend on age. Not 
only were there marked differences between different scientific domains but, more particularly 
different decades gave rise to different paces of productivity over a scientist’s career span. The 
pace as outputs build up is not constant. Moreover empirical evidence brought Levin and 
Stephan to underline the relevance of investments in R&D. Even though the numbers of 
scientific outputs deemed eligible was limited to a ten year period (statistics from 2003 till 2012 
were included), the quantity of publications may be biased by the author’s relative youth, and 
particularly so for younger scholars seeking the Habilitation for associate professor posts6. 
Recent findings report a certain disquiet about the links between age, cohorts, and periodicity 
that emerged in science productivity (Hall et al. 2005). So as to test gender discrimination and 
discrimination arising from sharing the same place of work, the second model controls for both 
gender and for affiliation of candidates with one committee member.  
                                                          
6 Some Committees displayed information about personal years spent in active research, taking into 
account starting age (first publication) minus official periods of maternal/paternal leave.  
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The third model introduces the ordinal variable of position. For each area studied, the position 
of confirmed associate professors (the closest rank to full professor) is set as “base” to compare 
it with each all other ranks. With the third model it is thus possible to see whether position is a 
good predictor of career, performance and age held constant. This leads to some discussions 
regarding the traditional pattern of rank with the issue of age: with publication features held 
constant, are younger or older academics within a given rank more likely to be rewarded? The 
model controls for the number of years elapsed since the last promotion too. Coefficients both 
positive and significant would imply the respect for the criteria of seniority. Likewise negative 
coefficients imply a priority laid upon more recently promoted individuals. The former 
assumption would confer priority on those who have a longer length of service in a given 
position, while an assumption based on the potential for a Department or a university would 
place greater weight on a rising candidate who has the same range and quality of publications 
because that implies he/she commands greater promise and potential. Here is a possible conflict 
that the third model seeks to clarify by taking into account the number of years elapsed since the 
individual’s last promotion.  
 
3. 1 Analyses and discussion  
 
In bibliometric areas (Table 3a) the models employ the H index as the main predictor to 
attain habilitation. Less frequently and with less clarity in terms of statistical significance, the 
number of articles published is relevant. Citations on the other hand bear negative coefficients, 
though in Physics these are not significant.  
In area 2, age is a negative and a strongly significant predictor (models 2). Younger 
candidates with same publications output were more likely to be awarded the habilitation. In 
areas 2 and 9 (models 3), current post is relevant. Confirmed associates, compared with 
permanent research assistants (positions labeled 3 and 4), have more chance of being awarded 
the habilitation.  
In Area 9, age is a significant negative predictor only when the position of candidates is 
also taken into account. If the three indicators of output are run with age, gender and affiliation, 
age shows no clear indications. Age becomes relevant as a possible explanation for being 
awarded the habilitation only when individuals hold the same rankings (model 3). When 
comparing individuals at same stage in their career and having same standing in terms of 
publications (both as number of and citations or quality of), the younger has more chance to get 
the award. In Physics being younger has a positive effect on its own (model 2), which could be 
coherent with traditional early career patterns in this field.  
Only for Area 9 does a shared affiliation of candidates with one of the Committees’ members 
play a role: in these sectors, applying whilst “having a colleague inside” made attaining the 
Habilitation more probable. In Model 3, the coefficient is higher than in Model 2, which implies 
that common affiliation played a stronger role in respect both of career ladder and preference for 
younger candidates.  
 
Table 3a around here  
 
Table 3b on the other hand provides the same models with the unique difference of sort of 
indicators (articles in top ranked journals, chapters and other articles, books). Interestingly, there 
is a marked difference between the disciplines of law and economics: for the former, the number 
of chapters and articles published are more decisive as to who is awarded the habilitation. The 
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latter sets store on the number of articles in top ranked reviews. The difference may reflect 
disciplinary cultures, degrees of internationalization and substantial consensus on selecting top 
ranked journals in Law. However, the common trait is that even in non-bibliometric sectors at 
least one kind of indicator discerns well the attainments. Yet, both Law and Economics draw on 
different explanations for obtaining the habilitation. In both, age is a solid predictor: younger 
candidates, having same indicators of performance (models 2 and 3), are more likely to be 
successful. This was not so for the two areas covered by bibliometric indicators. Still, the third 
models tell a story similar to Table 3a: the more advanced the individual is in ladder ranking, 
the greater the chance of being awarded the Habilitation as the final step in his – or her – career. 
As in Table3a, candidates who are more likely to be winners are younger in their respective 
ranks. In effect, within the ladder ranks there is a preference for those having a younger profile. 
Succinctly stated, these two findings reveal a system, which tends to favour early 
careers and good publication records regardless of years of service the individual has notched up 
in his – or her – current rank (i.e. years since last promotion: “yprom”). Seniority would imply 
that those with more time spent in the same rank would be more likely to attain the Habilitation. 
Yet, but all model 3s in the four areas examine show no statistical significance.  
 
Table 3b around here  
 
 
In principle, the filtering out mechanism the Habilitation established should undermine that 
informal practice of patronage and triage exercised by influential chair holders over their 
discretion. Even so social capital and patronage plus the practice of backing marginally 
qualified candidates cannot in future be ruled out entirely. Much may depend on how bargaining 
processes themselves evolve. That future competitions will take place locally and at the level of 
the individual institution, giving rise to even greater latitude and room for maneuvering. Added 
to this is the drive towards greater institutional autonomy in shaping the academic labour market 
(Musselin 2005a; Perotti 2002). Bearing these developments in mind, it is no easy task to 
estimate either the future effectiveness or the impact the Habilitation will have.  
 
5. Conclusions and Discussions About promotion through habilitation  
 
The data show clearly that seniority is no longer the main criterion and rationale for career 
advancement in Italian universities, though it must equally be admitted that neither data nor 
enquiry have ever demonstrated how widespread the practice of academic inbreeding was. In 
any case informal and opaque deals (Nelken 2009) and scripts (Dany Louvel Valette 2011) play 
an important part in promotions. In a more systematic way, Bourdieu (1984: 86-95) investigated 
in depth the system of power which is intrinsic to social reproduction in academia and therefore 
to academic careers. In his view, the relations between disciples and masters within hierarchies 
and communities cannot dispense with a particular form of clientelism, the root principle of 
which is: “None should take upon himself the responsibility of Master who has not himself sat 
at the feet of a Master”. Yet, the practice of seniority is nevertheless part of a juridical 
framework that New Public Management and the recent general law both seek to modify root 
and branch. Rather, it would appear that the principle of seniority is not yet dead, nor is it 
wholly recognized. In fact, time in current post is a negative predictor for research assistants 
applying for full professorship when compared with associates, academic output amongst 
candidates being held equal. Analyzing the age of candidates shows that those most likely to be 
awarded the Habilitation are individuals who reached their current ranking whilst relatively 
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young, output being held constant. It would appear that such individuals have the opening to, or 
the continued pursuit of, rapid advancement in their careers by dint of being habilitated for full 
professorial appointment.  
Such a development upholds the hypothesis that the Habilitation, as a new selective and 
filtering mechanism, generates change and adaptation without however uprooting current 
practices entirely. To this extent it may well be that the Italian system of academic careers may 
move progressively towards a system in which formal ranks are less important for career 
advancement. Other explanations should also be born in mind. It might well be that younger 
candidates – even though the H index is strongly time-related, and thus age dependent, (this 
does not apply to non-bibliometric sectors where straightforward citations are not taken into 
account) – and candidates in the earlier stages of their career path, were encouraged to publish 
differently from earlier academic generations. Hence, with increasing differences in output 
beginning at different times (Dietz Bozeman 2005) why the majority of younger scholars show 
better productivity, can be explained. On this basis, arguably the habilitation is more likely to 
deter the less productive who are, at the same time, older. Habilitation in Italy, we would 
suggest, is engaged in conferring reputation in a way different from before (Harley Muller-
Camen Collin 2004). Those less productive, even though senior in status or those currently 
occupying a rank which confers the right to demand further upward promotion, are winnowed 
out.  
Finally, the Italian system, even though profoundly overhauled by the recent general 
Law, remains in respect of the academic career ladder – a regular employee track.  It did not opt 
to move over to being a contract track or a tenure track (Enders, 2001). More analyses and data 
(both in terms of variables, observations over time, and real competition between the winners as 
well to get real posts) will have to be gathered before any new pattern can be identified and 
discerned.  
To sum up, despite some disciplinary differences, generally one or two indicators out of 
three clearly act as the main determinant of the decisions to award or not to award eligibility to 
apply for a full professorship. Hence performance, especially in terms of quality and strategic 
scientific publications, is the key factor in pushing on and climbing the academic career ladder 
to the top (full professorship). Furthermore, younger scholars in each position can bypass their 
older peers, even with the same indicators of productivity. May be their higher potential means 
more is expected of them. However those in the upper ranks still have some advantage, even 
though younger candidates – as models 3 show – are preferred to the more senior. This looks to 
be an interesting development that merits being pursued further. 
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Table 1. – Demographic statistics, candidates and average age of those awarded 
and not awarded habilitations by rank. Bibliometric areas; full professorships 
ranks  














1.Researcher fixed-term 10Law 77 3.4 1 1.3 --- 38.0 190 3.6 0 0 --- 38.0 
2. Researcher fixed-term 05Decree 45 2.0 0 0.0 --- --- 155 2.9 2 1.3 --- --- 
3. Researcher not-confirmed 128 5.7 11 8.6 41.4 37.8 322 6.1 11 3.4 41.4 37.8 
4. Researcher (confirmed) 737 32.7 119 16.1 45.1 47.7 1603 30.4 122 7.6 45.1 47.7 
5. Ass. not-confirmed p. 75 3.3 53 70.7 44.2 45.9 218 4.1 129 59.2 44.2 45.9 
6. Ass. confirmed p. 653 29.0 359 55.0 50.8 53.7 1228 23.3 645 52.5 50.8 53.7 
7. Ass. Professor 11 0.5 9 81.8 50.8 53.7 47 0.9 28 59.6 43.1 48.0 
8. Full professor 471 20.9 0 0.0 --- --- 1358 25.8 0 0.0 --- --- 
Others 56 2.5 1 1.8 48.0 --- 148 2.8 2 1.4 48.0 --- 
Total 2253 100.0 553 24.5% 48.7 50.2 5269 100.0 939 17.8% 45.6 46.4 
 




Table 2. – Demographic statistics, candidates and average ages of those awarded 
and not awarded habilitation by rank. Non-bibliometric areas; full professorship 
ranks 














1.Researcher fixed-term 10Law 99 2.0 0 0.0 --- --- 138 2.9 5 3.6 42.8 50.0 
2. Researcher fixed-term 05Decree 102 2.1 0 0.0 --- --- 162 3.4 1 0.6 41.0 --- 
3. Researcher not-confirmed 289 5.9 4 1.4 --- 42.8 282 5.9 12 4.3 36.7 36.3 
4. Researcher (confirmed) 1659 34.0 70 4.2 38.7 46.2 1432 29.7 103 7.2 39.8 44.3 
5. Ass. not-confirmed p. 191 3.9 80 41.9 40.3 43.1 211 4.4 137 64.9 41.7 44.0 
6. Ass. confirmed p. 895 18.4 470 52.5 45.1 48.6 1075 22.3 586 54.5 46.3 49.5 
7. Ass. Professor 39 0.8 14 35.9 38.2 47.1 29 0.6 14 48.3 41.2 41.3 
8. Full professor 1388 28.5 0 0.0 --- --- 1351 28.1 0 0.0 --- --- 
Others 212 4.3 5 2.4 48.0 42.8 135 2.8 1 0.7 41.0 --- 
Total 4874 100.0 643 13.2 44.1 47.4 4815 100.0 859 17.8 44.5 47.9 
 




Table 3a. Models for attaining the habilitation for full professorships in 
bibliometric areas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 A2_1 A2_1 A2_1 A9_1 A9_1 A9_1 
h_i 0.0365* 0.0299* 0.0326* 0.235*** 0.243*** 0.273*** 
 (2.47) (2.01) (2.13) (5.27) (5.39) (5.50) 
art 0.000209 0.00145 0.00117 0.0111 0.0103 0.0144* 
 (0.11) (0.73) (0.57) (1.89) (1.75) (2.10) 
cit -0.00129 -0.00184 -0.00139 -0.0140** -0.0153** -0.0132* 
 (-1.29) (-1.84) (-1.33) (-2.75) (-2.96) (-2.27) 
aff  0.129 0.0881  0.790*** 0.901*** 
  (0.51) (0.34)  (3.88) (4.05) 
age  -0.0529*** -0.0884***  -0.00661 -0.0753*** 
  (-3.60) (-4.03)  (-0.50) (-4.19) 
sex  0.280 0.232  -0.135 -0.274 
  (1.07) (0.85)  (-0.68) (-1.27) 
1. Fixed-term R.A. 10Law 
 0    
 (.)    
2. Fixed-term R.A. 05Decree 
    0 
    (.) 
3. R.A. not-confirmed 
 -2.093**   -3.342*** 
 (-2.99)   (-4.38) 
4. Researcher assistant (confirmed) 
 -1.345***   -2.870*** 
 (-4.91)   (-10.13) 
5. Ass. not-confirmed p. 
 0.334   -0.594* 
 (0.76)   (-2.16) 
7. Ass. Professor 
 -0.270   -0.694 
 (-0.32)   (-1.43) 
yprom   0.0120   0.0269 
   (0.31)   (0.79) 
_cons 0.144 2.550** 4.555*** -1.217*** -0.903 2.414** 
  (0.72) (3.06) (4.23) (-5.24) (-1.26) (2.79) 
N 552 552 551 932 931 927 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 






Table 3b. Models for attaining the habilitation for full professorships in non-
bibliometric areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 A12_1 A12_1 A12_1 A13_1 A13_1 A13_1 
Top_art  0.0160 0.00481 0.0173 0.262*** 0.227*** 0.236*** 
 (0.94) (0.28) (0.96) (8.40) (7.10) (7.05) 
Book -0.0421 -0.0575 -0.0584 0.0338 0.0309 0.0187 
 (-1.57) (-1.16) (-1.10) (0.96) (0.86) (0.51) 
Chapt 0.0307*** 0.0291*** 0.0250*** 0.0243*** 0.0209*** 0.0236*** 
 (4.54) (4.23) (3.57) (4.15) (3.53) (3.86) 
Aff  0.548 0.612  0.468 0.544* 
  (1.49) (1.57)  (1.84) (2.09) 
Age  -0.0559*** -0.0798***  -0.0442*** -0.0452** 
  (-4.30) (-4.83)  (-3.56) (-2.93) 
Sex  0.159 0.220  0.0796 0.000713 
  (0.89) (1.18)  (0.50) (0.00) 
1. Fixed-term R.A. 10Law 
    -0.685 
    (-0.55) 
2. Fixed-term R.A. 05Decree 
    -2.087 
    (-1.31) 
3. R.A. not-confirmed 
 0   -1.544* 
 (.)   (-2.38) 
4. Researcher assistant (confirmed) 
 -2.187***   -1.305*** 
 (-5.70)   (-4.85) 
5. Ass. not-confirmed p. 
 -0.524   0.136 
 (-1.81)   (0.51) 
7. Ass. Professor 
 -0.900   -0.0767 
 (-1.44)   (-0.10) 
yprom   0.0142   -0.0698 
   (0.32)   (-1.92) 
_cons -0.844*** 1.603* 2.866*** -0.991*** 1.053 1.622* 
 (-5.26) (2.29) (3.61) (-5.89) (1.58) (2.12) 
N 637 637 633 858 858 858 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: derived from MIUR data 
 
